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Alarmist narratives about online misinformation continue to gain traction despite evidence that its 
prevalence and impact are overstated. Drawing on research questioning the use of big data in social 
science and reception studies, we identify six misconceptions about misinformation and examine 
the conceptual and methodological challenges they raise. The first three misconceptions concern 
the prevalence and circulation of misinformation. First, the internet is not rife with misinformation 
or news, but with memes and entertaining content. Second, scientists focused on social media 
because it is methodologically convenient, but misinformation is not just a social media problem. 
Third, falsehoods don’t spread faster than the truth, how we define (mis)information influences 
our results and their practical implications. The second three misconceptions concern the impact 
and the reception of misinformation. First, people don’t believe everything they see on the internet: 
sheer volume of engagement should not be conflated with belief. Second, misinformation’s 
influence on people’s behavior is overblown since it often preaches to the choir. Third, people are 
more likely to be uninformed than misinformed, surveys overestimate misperceptions and say little 
about the causal influence of misinformation. To appropriately understand and fight 
misinformation, future research needs to address these challenges. 
 







Concerns about misinformation are rising the world over. Today, Americans are more concerned 
about misinformation than sexism, racism, terrorism or climate change (Mitchell et al., 2019). 
Most of them (60%) think that “made-up news” had a major impact in the 2020 election (Auxier, 
2020). Internet users are more afraid of fake news than online fraud and online bullying (World 
Risk Poll, 2020). Numerous scientific and journalistic articles claim that online misinformation is 
the source of many contemporary socio-political issues, while neglecting deeper factors such as 
the decline of trust in institutions (Benkler et al., 2018; Bennett & Livingston, 2018, 2020) or in 
the media (Newman et al., 2019, 2020). 
Yet, the scientific literature is clear. Unreliable news—including false, deceptive, low-quality or 
hyper partisan news (Jack, 2017; Kapantai et al., 2021; Tandoc et al., 2018)—represents a minute 
portion of people’s information diet (Allen, Howland, et al., 2020; Cordonier & Brest, 2021); most 
people don’t share unreliable news (Grinberg et al., 2019; Guess et al., 2019); on average people 
deem fake news less plausible than true news (Allen, Arechar, et al., 2020; Pennycook & Rand, 
2021); social media are not the only culprits (Benkler et al., 2018; Bennett & Livingston, 2020; 
Tsfati et al., 2020); and fake news’ influence on large socio-political events is overblown (Bail et 
al., 2020; Guess et al., 2020; Mercier, 2020; Nyhan, 2020).  
Because of this disconnect between public discourse and empirical findings, a growing body of 
research argues that alarmist narratives about misinformation should be understood as a “moral 
panic” (Anderson, 2021; Carlson, 2020; Jungherr & Schroeder, 2021; Marwick, 2018; 
Mitchelstein et al., 2020; Nyhan, 2020; Simons, 2018). In particular, these narratives can be 
characterized as one of the many “technopanics” (Marwick, 2008) that have emerged with the rise 
of digital media. These panics repeat themselves cyclically (Orben, 2020), and are fueled by a wide 
range of actors such as the mass media, policymakers, and experts (Cohen, 1972, p. 8). A well-
known example is the broadcast of Orson Welles' radio drama The War of the Worlds, in 1938, 
which was quickly followed by alarmist headlines from the newspaper industry claiming that 
United States experienced a mass hysteria. Some years later, Hadley Cantril gave academic 
credence to this idea by estimating that a million of Americans truly believed in the Martian 
invasion (Cantril et al., 1940). Yet, his claim turned out to be empirically unfounded. As Brad 
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Schwartz (2015, p. 184) explains “With the crude statistical tool of the day, there was simply no 
way of accurately judging how many people heard War of the Worlds, much less how many of 
them were frightened by it. But all the evidence—the size of the Mercury’s audience, the relatively 
small number of protest letters, and the lack of reported damage caused by the panic—suggest that 
few people listened and even fewer believed. Anything else is just guesswork.” 
The “Myth of the War of the Worlds Panic” (Slate, 2013) illustrates how academic research can 
fuel, and legitimize, misconceptions on misinformation. A plethora of research has documented 
the role played by media and political discourse in building an alarmist narrative on 
misinformation (Anderson, 2021; Carlson, 2020; Jungherr & Schroeder, 2021;  Marwick, 2018; 
Mitchelstein et al., 2020; Nyhan, 2020; Simons, 2018). Here, we offer a critical review of academic 
discourse on misinformation, which suddenly erupted after the 2016 US presidential election with 
the publication of more than two thousand scientific articles (Allen, Howland, et al., 2020; 
Righetti, 2021). We explain why overgeneralizations of scientific results and poor considerations 
of method limitations may lead to misconceptions about misinformation in the public sphere. 
Drawing on research questioning the use of big data in social sciences (Boyd & Crawford, 2012; 
Kitchin, 2014; Tufekci, 2014) and reception studies (Livingstone, 2019), we identify six common 
misconceptions about misinformation (i.e. statements often found in press articles and scientific 
studies but not supported by empirical findings). First, we highlight how possible shortcomings of 
techno-centered approaches and big data methods can lead to misconceptions about the prevalence 
and circulation of misinformation. Second, we point out some limits of the quantitative methods 
to capture misinformation impact and reception. Table 1 offers an overview of the misconceptions 




Figure 1. Frequently encountered misconceptions on misinformation on the left, and 
misinterpretation of research results associated with these misconceptions on the right.  
 
2. Misconceptions about misinformation prevalence and circulation 
 
2.1. The internet is rife with misinformation  
 
During the 2016 US presidential campaign, the top 20 fake news stories on Facebook have 
accumulated nearly 9 million shares, reactions, and comments, between August 1st and November 
8th (BuzzFeed, 2016). But what does 9 million interactions mean on Facebook? If the 1.5 billion 
Facebook users in 2016 had commented, reacted, or shared, just one piece of content per week, 
the 9 million engagements with the top fake news stories would only represent 0.042% of all their 




According to one estimate, in the US, between 2019 and 2020, traffic to untrustworthy websites 
increased by 70%, whereas traffic to trustworthy websites increased by 47%, which led to the 
following headline: “Covid-19 and the rise of misinformation and misunderstanding” (Majid, 
2021). Yet, traffic to trustworthy websites is one order of magnitude higher than the traffic on 
untrustworthy websites. In March 2020, untrustworthy websites received 30 million additional 
views compared to March 2019, whereas traffic to trustworthy websites increased by 2 billion. 
 
These two examples highlight the need to zoom out of the big numbers generated by 
misinformation and to put them in perspective with people’s information practices. The average 
US internet user spend less than 10 minutes a day consuming news online (Allen, Howland, et al., 
2020) and the average French internet user spend less than 5 minutes doing so (Cordonier & Brest, 
2021). News consumption represents only 14% of Americans’ media diet and 3% of the time 
French people spend on the internet. What about misinformation in all that? It represents 0.15% 
of American media diet and 0.16% of French people connected time. In addition, misinformation 
consumption is heavily skewed: 61% of the French participants did not consult any unreliable 
sources during the 30-day period of the study (Cordonier & Brest, 2021), and a small minority of 
people account for most of the misinformation consumed and shared online (Grinberg et al., 2019; 
Nelson & Taneja, 2018).  
 
Just as the internet is not rife with news, the internet is not rife with misinformation. When people 
want to inform themselves, they primarily access established news sites (Fletcher et al., 2018; 
Guess et al., 2020), or, more commonly, turn on the TV. Misinformation receives little online 
attention compared to reliable news, and, in turn, reliable news receives little online attention 
compared to everything else that people do. People don’t use the internet primarily to get informed, 
but rather to connect with friends, shop, work, and more generally for entertainment (Gandy, 2002; 
Tewksbury, 2003). Documenting the large volume of interactions generated by misinformation is 
important, but it should not been taken as a proof of its predominence. Big numbers are the rule 





That being said, it is not always possible for researchers to consider the big picture since access to 
social media data is restricted and often partial (Freelon, 2018; King & Persily, 2020). As a result, 
many research questions remain unexplored (Pasquetto et al., 2020) and conclusions are 
sometimes uncertain, even when private companies provide access to huge amount of data. For 
instance, despite its unprecedented size, the URLs dataset released by Facebook, via Social 
Science One’s program (King & Persily, 2020), only includes URLs that have been publicly shared 
at least 100 times. This threshold of 100 publics shares overestimates by a factor of four the 
prevalence of misinformation on Facebook (Allen et al., 2021). To better assess the scale of 
misinformation, and the communication contexts (e.g. private, semi-public, and public) through 
wich it circulates, better data access and more cross-platforms analyses are needed (Bode & Vraga, 
2018; Cardon et al., 2019; Cointet et al., 2021; Rogers, 2021; Rossini et al., 2020).  
 
2.2. Misinformation is just a social media problem 
 
The internet drastically reduced the cost of accessing, producing, and sharing information. Social 
media reduced friction even more: the cost of connecting with physically distant minds is lower 
than ever. The media landscape is no longer controlled by traditional gatekeepers, and 
misinformation, just like any other content, is easier to publish. Today’s wide access to rich digital 
traces makes contemporary large-scale issues like misinformation easier to study (Lazer et al., 
2009), which can give the impression that misinformation was less prevalent in the past (compared 
to reliable information). Yet, we need to be careful when comparing the big data sets that we have 
today with the much poorer and smaller data sets of the past. We should also resist the temptation 
of idealizing the past. There is no golden age in which people only believed and communicated 
true information (Acerbi, 2019b; Nyhan, 2020). Conspiracy theories spread long before social 
media (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Misinformation, such as rumors, is a universal feature of 
human societies, not a modern exception (Pettegree, 2014, pp. 4–5). Before the advent of the 
internet, in the 70s, rumors about “sex thieves” arose from interactions between strangers in 
markets and spread throughout Africa (Bonhomme, 2016). In 1969, rumors about women being 
abducted and sold as sex slaves proliferated in the French city of Orleans (Morin, 1969). There are 
countless historical examples of unverified information spreading by word of mouth (Smith et al., 
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1999). We won’t report them all. Our point is that one cannot assume that misinformation is more 
common today simply because it is more available and measured.   
 
Social scientists focus on social media—Twitter in particular—because it is methodologically 
convenient (Tufekci, 2014). But active social media users are not representative of the general 
population (Cihon & Yasseri, 2016; Mellon & Prosser, 2017), and most of U.S. social media users 
(70%) say they rarely, or never, post about political or social issues (and only 9% say they often 
do so; Mcclain, 2021). Traditional media may play an important role in spreading misinformation, 
but because of the current focus on social media, little is known about misinformation in widely 
used sources of information such as television or radio. There is a gap between what scientists 
focus on (fake news shared by ordinary users on social media), what people actually do on social 
media (connecting with others rather than consuming or sharing news) and how they inform 
themselves (through television rather than online). Since 2017, 2210 scientific articles have been 
published on misinformation and 1,658 on social networks, while only 329 have looked at 
television news. And the number of papers studying misinformation on television can be counted 
on the fingers of one hand (Allen, Howland, et al., 2020; see also: Righetti, 2021). Television is a 
gateway to misinformation from elites, most notably from politicians (Benkler et al., 2018; Tsfati 
et al., 2020). For instance, Trump’s tweets in his final year of office were on cable news channels 
for a total of 32 hours (Wardle, 2021). 
 
These limitations invite more nuanced views on the role of social media in misinformation 
problem, at least until more work is carried out on misinformation in legacy media and offline 
networks. 
 
2.3. Falsehoods spread faster than the truth.  
 
The idea that falsehoods spread faster than the truth was amplified and legitimized by an influential 
article published in Science which found that “it took the truth about six times as long as falsehood 
to reach 1,500 people” (Vosoughi et al., 2018, p.3). The study was quickly covered in various 
international outlets such as The New York Time, The Washington Post or Slate (Lohr, 2018; 
McArdle, 2018; Oremus, 2018), and has been cited over three thousand times in the scientific 
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literature. Yet, Vosoughi and his colleagues didn’t examine the spread of true and false news online 
but of “contested news” that fact-checkers classified as either true or false, leaving aside a large 
number of uncontested news that was extremely viral (e.g. the wedding of the royal family in the 
UK or Messi’s arrival at the PSG). The authors themselves publicly explained this sampling bias1. 
Yet, journalists and scientists quickly overgeneralized, and nuances were lost. Subsequent studies 
found conflicting results, with science-based evidence and fact-checking being more retweeted 
than false information during the COVID-19 pandemic (Pulido et al., 2020) and news from 
hyperpartisan sites not disseminating more quickly than mainstream news on the Australian 
Twitter (Bruns & Keller, 2020). Moreover, a cross platform study found no differences in 
spreading pattern of news from reliable and questionable sources (Cinelli et al., 2020). This is not 
to say that the Vosoughi et al. finginds on fact-checked news do not hold, but rather that how 
information and misinformation are defined greatly influences the conclusions we draw.  
 
Misinterpretations of that article raise the questions: What categories should we use? Do 
dichotomous measures of veracity make sense? How should we define misinformation? These past 
few years, important efforts have been made to refine the blurred concept of “fake news” (for a 
review see Kapantai et al., 2021; Tandoc et al., 2018). In practice, though, researchers use the 
ready-made categories constructed by fact-checkers, putting under the same heading content that 
differs in terms of harmfulness or facticity.  
 
How (mis)information is defined influence the perceived scale of the problem and the solutions to 
fight it (Rogers, 2020). For instance, in 2016, a famous BuzzFeed article showed that fake news 
outperformed true news on Facebook in term of engagement prior to the U.S. presidential election 
(Silverman, 2016). But when excluding hyperpartisan news from the fake news category (such as 
Fox News), reliable news largely outperformed fake news (Rogers, 2020). Politically biased 
information that is not false could have harmful effects (Longhi, 2021), but does it belong in the 
misinformation category? As Rogers (2021) explains, “stricter definitions of misinformation 
(imposter sites, pseudo-science, conspiracy, extremism only) lessen the scale of the problem, while 
roomier ones (adding “hyperpartisan” and “junk” sites serving clickbait) increase it, albeit rarely 
 




to the point where it outperforms non-problematic (or more colloquially, mainstream) media” (p. 
2). Of course, it would be impossible to find a unanimous typology that would put every piece of 
news in the "right" category, but it is important to be mindful of the limitations of the categories 
we use.  
 
3. Misconceptions about misinformation impact and reception 
In the first part of this article, we highlighted misconceptions about the prevalence and circulation 
of misinformation. In the second part of this article, we look at misconceptions about the impact 
and reception of misinformation. It is not because the numbers generated by misinformation are 
actually small compared to reliable information or non-news content that we can dismiss them. 
Small numbers could make a difference at a societal level, but to accurately assess their impact 
and how they translate into attitudes and behaviors, we need to understand what they mean. 
3.1. People believe everything they see on the internet.  
Media effects are increasingly measured via big data methods (Athique, 2018, p. 59) paying little 
attention to audience’s agency and communicative context (Couldry, 2004; Livingstone, 2019; 
Livingstone & Das, 2013). As danah boyd and Kate Crawford (2012, p. 666) put it, “why people 
do things, write things, or make things can be lost in the sheer volume of numbers”. For instance, 
it is tempting to conflate prevalence with impact, but the diffusion of inaccurate information should 
be distinguished from its reception. Sharing or liking is not believing. People interact with 
misinformation for a variety of reasons: to socialize, to express skepticism, outrage or anger, to 
signal group membership, or simply to have a good laugh (Acerbi, 2019a; Altay et al., 2021; 
Berriche & Altay, 2020; Brashier & Schacter, 2020; Duffy et al., 2019; Guess et al., 2019; Metzger 
et al., 2021; Ng & Yuan, 2020; Osmundsen et al., 2020; Tandoc et al., 2018; Waruwu et al., 2020). 
Engagement metrics are an imperfect proxy of information reception and are not sufficient to 
estimate the impact of misinformation. As Wagner and Boczkowski (2019, p.881) note, “studies 
that measure exposure to fake news seem sometimes to easily infer acceptance of content due to 
mere consumption of it, therefore perhaps exaggerating potential negative effects […] future 
studies should methodologically account for critical or ironic news sharing, as well as other forms 




With the datafication of society, scientists’ attention shifted from empirical audiences to the 
digital traces that they leave. But we should not forget the people who left these traces in the 
digital record, nor neglect the rich theoretical framework produced by decades of reception 
studies based on in situ observations of people consuming media content (Lull, 1988; Morley, 
1980; Neuman, 1982), or in-depth qualitative interviews (Katz et al., 1974; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 
1955; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Liebes & Katz, 1990). People are not passive receptacle of 
information. They are active, interpretative, and they domesticate technologies in complex and 
unexpected ways (Livingstone, 2019). People are more skeptical than gullible when browsing 
online (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018). Trust in the media is low, but trust in information encountered 
on social media is even lower. And people deploy a variety of strategies to detect and counter 
misinformation, such as checking different sources or turning to fact-checks (Wagner and 
Boczkowski, 2019). Similarly, far-right populist, anti-vaxxers or anti-maskers, deploy 
sophisticated verification strategies to “fact-check” the news in their own way (Berriche, 2021; 
Tripodi, 2018) and produce “objectivist counter-expertise” (Lee et al., 2021; Ylä-Anttila, 2018). 
	
3.2. Misinformation has a strong influence on people’s behavior 
 
Sometimes, however, people believe what they see on the internet and engagement metrics do 
translate into belief. Yet, even when misinformation is believed, it does not necessarily mean that 
it changed anyone’s mind or behavior. First, people largely consume politically congenial 
misinformation (Guess et al., 2019, 2021). That is, they consume misinformation they already 
agree with, or are predisposed to accept. Congenial misinformation preaches the choir and is 
unlikely to have drastic effects beyond reinforcing previously held beliefs. Second, even when 
misinformation changes people’s minds and leads to the formation of new (mis)beliefs, it is not 
clear if these (mis)beliefs ever translate into behaviors. Attitudes are only weak predictors of 
behaviors. This problem is well known in public policies as the value-action gap (Kollmuss & 
Agyeman, 2002). Most notoriously, people report being increasingly concerned about the 




Common misbeliefs, such as conspiracy theories, are likely to be cognitively held in such a way 
that limit their influence on behaviors (Mercier, 2020; Mercier & Altay, In press). For instance, 
the behavioral consequences that follows from common misbeliefs are often at odd with what we 
would expect from people actually believing it. As Jonathan Kay (2011, p. 185) noted “one of the 
great ironies of the Truth movement is that its activists typically hold their meetings in large, 
unsecured locations such as college auditoriums—even as they insist that government agents will 
stop at nothing to protect their conspiracy for world domination from discovery.” Often, these 
misbeliefs are likely to be post-hoc rationalization of pre-existing attitudes, such as distrust of 
institutions.  
 
In the wild, it is difficult to measure how much attitude change misinformation causes, and it is a 
daunting task to assess its impact on people’s behavior. Survey relying on correlational data tell 
us little about causation. For example, belief in conspiracy theories is associated with many costly 
behaviors, such as COVID-19 vaccine refusal (Bertin et al., 2020). Does it mean that vaccine 
hesitancy is caused by conspiracy theories? No, it could be that both vaccine hesitancy and 
adhesion to conspiracy theories are caused by another factor, such as low trust in institutions 
(Mercier & Altay, Forthcoming). A few ingenious studies allowed some causal inferences to be 
drawn. For instance, Kim and Kim (2019) used a longitudinal survey to capture people’s beliefs 
and behaviors both before and after the diffusion of the “Obama is a Muslim” rumor. They found 
that after the diffusion of the rumor more people were indeed likely to believe that Obama was a 
Muslim. Yet, this effect was “driven almost entirely by those predisposed to dislike Obama” (p. 
307), and the diffusion of the rumor had no measurable effect on people’s intent to vote for Obama. 
This should not come as a surprise, considering that even political campaign and political 
advertising only have weak and indirect effect on voters (Broockman & Green, 2014; Hill et al., 
2013; Kalla & Broockman, 2018; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). As David Karpf (2019) writes 
“Generating social media interactions is easy; mobilizing activists and persuading voters is hard.”  
 
The idea that exposure to misinformation (or information) has a strong and direct influence on 
people’s attitudes and behaviors comes from a misleading analogy of social influence according 
to which ideas infect human minds like viruses infect human bodies. Americans did not vote for 
Trump in 2016 because they were brainwashed. There is no such thing as “brainwashing” 
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(Carruthers, 2009). Information is not passed from brain to brain like a virus is passed from body 
to body. When humans communicate, they constantly re-interpret the messages they receive, and 
modify the ones they send (Boyer, 2018; Claidière et al., 2014). The same tweet will create very 
different mental representations in each brain that reads it, and the public representations people 
leave behind them, in the form of digital traces, are only an imperfect proxy of their private mental 
representations. The virus metaphor, all too popular during the COVID-19 pandemic – think of 
the “infodemic” epithet – is misleading (Simon & Camargo, 2021). It is reminiscent of outdated 
models of communication (e.g. “hypodermic needle model”) assuming that audiences were passive 
and easily swayed by pretty much everything they heard or read (Lasswell, 1927). As Anderson 
(2021) notes “we might see the role of Facebook and other social media platforms as returning us 
to a pre-Katz and Lazarsfeld era, with fears that Facebook is “radicalizing the world” and that 
Russian bots are injecting disinformation directly in the bloodstream of the polity.” These premises 
are at odd with what we know about human psychology and clashes with decades of data from 
communication studies.  
 
3.3. A large share of people is misinformed.  
 
Headlines about the ubiquity of misbeliefs are rampant in the media and are most often based on 
surveys. But how well do surveys measure misbeliefs? Luskin and colleagues (2018) analyzed the 
design of 180 media surveys with close-ended questions measuring belief in misinformation. They 
found that more than 90% of these surveys lacked an explicit “Don’t know” or “Not sure” option 
and used formulations encouraging guessing such as “As far as you know …,” or “Would you say 
that …”. Often, participants answer these questions by guessing the correct answer, and report 
holding beliefs that they did not hold before the survey (Graham, 2021). Not providing, or not 
encouraging, “Don’t know” answers is known to increase guessing even more (Luskin & Bullock, 
2011). Guessing would not be a major issue if it only added noise to the data. To find out, Luskin 
and colleagues (2018) tested the impact of not providing ‘Don’t know’ answers and encouraging 
guessing on the prevalence of misbeliefs. They found that it overestimates the proportion of 
incorrect answers by 9 percentage points (25 to 16), and, when considering only people who report 
being confident in holding a misperception, it overestimates incorrect answers by 20 percentage 
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points (25 to 5). In short, surveys items measuring misinformation overestimate the extent to which 
people are misinformed, eclipsing the share of those who are simply uninformed. 
 
In the same vein, conspiratorial beliefs are notoriously difficult to measure and surveys tend to 
exaggerate their prevalence (Clifford et al., 2019). For instance, participants in survey experiments 
display a preference for positive response options (yes versus no, or agree versus disagree) which 
inflates agreement with statements, including conspiracy theories, by up to 50% (Hill & Roberts, 
2021; Krosnick, 2018). Moreover, the absence of “Don’t know” options, together with the 
impossibility to express one’s preference for conventional explanations in comparison to 
conspiratorial explanations, greatly overestimate the prevalence of conspiratorial beliefs (Clifford 
et al., 2019). These methodological problems contributed to unsupported alarmists’ narratives 
about the prevalence of conspiracy theories, such as Qanon going mainstream (Enders et al. 2021). 
For example, the New York Times recently wrote the following headline “QAnon Now as Popular 
in U.S. as Some Major Religions, Poll Suggests”. The problem is that the poll they referred to did 
not measure QAnon belonging—which is low (around 6%) and has remained stable (Enders et al. 
2021)—but beliefs associated with QAnon, such as allegations of sex trafficking. These beliefs 
predate QAnon and do not tell us whether they are hold by QAnon supporters or not (Uscinski & 
Enders, 2021).  
 
Moreover, the misperceptions that surveys measure are skewed toward politically controversial 
and polarizing misperception, which is not representative of the misperceptions that people 
actually hold (Nyhan, 2020). This could contribute to fuel affective polarization by emphasizing 
differences between groups instead of similarities and inflate the prevalence of misbeliefs. When 
misperceptions become group markers, participants use them to signal group membership—
whether they truly believe the misperceptions or not (Bullock et al., 2013). Response to factual 
questions in survey experiments are known to be vulnerable to “partisan cheerleading” (Bullock 
et al., 2013; Prior et al., 2015), in which, instead of stating their true beliefs, participants give 
politically congenial responses. Quite famously a large share of Americans believed that Donald 
Trump’s inauguration in 2017 was more crowded than Barrack Obama’s in 2009, despite being 
presented with visual evidence of the contrary. Partisanship does not directly influence people’s 
perception: misperceptions about the size of the crowds were largely driven by expressive 
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responding and guessing. Respondents who supported President Trump “intentionally provide 
misinformation” for the purposes of reaffirming their partisan identity (Schaffner & Luks, 2018, 
p. 136). The extent to which expressive responding contributes to the overestimation of other 
political misbeliefs is debated (Levy & Ross, 2021; Nyhan, 2020), but it is probably significant.  
 
Solutions have been proposed to overcome these flaws and measure misbeliefs more accurately, 
such as including confidence-in-knowledge measures (Graham, 2018) and considering only 
participants who firmly and confidently say they believe misinformation items as misinformed 
(Luskin et al. 2018). Yet, even when people report confidently holding misbeliefs, these misbeliefs 
are highly unstable across time, much more so than beliefs (Graham, 2021). For instance, the 
responses of people saying they are 100 percent certain that climate change is not occurring have 
the same measurement properties as responses of people saying they are 100 percent certain the 
continents are not moving or that the Sun goes around the Earth. Participants’ answer at time T 
does not predict their answer at time T+1. In other words, flipping a coin would give a similar 
response pattern.  
 
So far, we have seen that even well-designed surveys overestimate the prevalence of misbeliefs. 
A further issue is that surveys unreliably measure exposure to misinformation and the occurrence 
of rare events such as fake news exposure. People report being exposed to a substantial amount of 
misinformation and recall having been exposed to particular fake headlines (Allcott & Gentzkow, 
2017). To estimate the reliability of these measures, Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) showed 
participants the 14 most popular fake news during the American election campaign, together with 
14 made-up “placebo fake news”. 15% of participants declared having been exposed to one of the 
fourteen “real fake news”, but 14% also declared having been exposed to one of the 14 “fake news 
placebos”. These findings echo the large discrepancy between self-report media use and actual 
media use (Parry et al., 2021). 
 
During the pandemic, many people supposedly engaged in extremely dangerous cleaning practices 
to fight COVID-19 because of misinformation encountered on social media, such as drinking 
diluted bleach (Islam et al., 2020). This led to headlines such as “’Hundreds dead' because of 
Covid-19 misinformation” (Coleman, 2020) or “COVID-19 disinformation killed thousands of 
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people, according to a study” (Paris Match Belgique, 2020). Yet, the study is actually silent 
regarding causality, and cannot be taken as evidence that misinformation had any causal impact 
on people’s behavior (France info, 2020). For instance, 39% of Americans reported having 
engaged in at least one cleaning practice not recommended by the CDC, 4% of Americans reported 
drinking or gargling a household disinfectant while another 4% reported drinking or gargling 
diluted bleach (Gharpure et al., 2020). These percentages should not be taken at face value. A 
replication of the survey found that these worrying responses are entirely attributable to 
problematic respondents who also report ‘recently having had a fatal heart attack’ or ‘eating 
concrete for its iron content’ at a rate similar to that of ingesting household cleaners (Litman et al., 
2020; reminiscent of the “lizardman’s constant” by Alexander, 2013). The authors conclude that 
“Once inattentive, mischievous, and careless respondents are taken out of the analytic sample we 





We identified six misconceptions about the prevalence and impact of misinformation, and 
examined the conceptual and methodological challenges they raise. First, the misinformation 
problem should be evaluated at the scale of the information ecosystem, e.g. by including news 
consumption and news avoidance in the equation. Second, social media make the perfect villain, 
but before blaming them for misinformation problem more work needs to be done on legacy 
media and offline networks. Third, we should be mindful of the categories that we use since they 
influence our results and their practical implications. Fourth, more qualitative and quantitative 
reception studies are needed to understand people’s informational practices. Digital traces don’t 
always mean what we expect them to, and often, to fully understand them, fine-grained analyses 
are needed. Fifth, we should resist monocausal explanations and blame misinformation for 
complex socio-economic problems. People are not gullible: if anything, they are stubborn and 
reject too much reliable information because they don’t trust enough. Sixth, the quantity of 
misinformed people is likely to be overestimated. Surveys measuring misbeliefs should include 
“Don’t know” or “Not sure” options and avoid wording that encourages guessing. Survey 
measuring adhesion to conspiracy theories should allow participants to express their preference 
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for conventional explanations. More broadly, conclusions drawn from engagement metrics, 
online experiment, or surveys, need to be taken with a grain of salt, as they tend to overestimate 
the prevalence of misbeliefs, and tell us little about the causal influence of misinformation and its 
reception.  
 
To appropriately understand and fight misinformation, it is crucial to have these methodological 
blind spots in mind, otherwise we risk worsening the problems we intended to fight in the first 
place. Just like misinformation, misinformation on misinformation could have deleterious effects 
(Altay et al., 2020; Jungherr & Schroeder, 2021; Miró-Llinares & Aguerri, 2021; Nyhan, 2020; 
Tandoc et al., 2021; Van Duyn & Collier, 2019), such as diverting society’s attention and resources 
from the underlying socio-economic problems and fueling people’s mistrust of the media even 
more. For instance, perceived prevalence of misinformation is associated with narrower media diet 
and less trust in the media (Shapiro, 2020) and with a lower willingness to share reliable news on 
social media (Yang & Horning, 2020). 
 
Instead of focusing on the small share of people who consume unreliable sources, it would be more 
fruitful to focus on the large share of people who are overly skeptical of reliable sources and rarely 
consume any news (e.g. Allen, Howland, et al., 2020; Cordonier & Brest, 2021). Despite legitimate 
concerns about misinformation, people are more likely to be uninformed than misinformed (Li & 
Wagner, 2020), even during the COVID-19 pandemic (Cushion et al., 2020). People commonly 
hold false beliefs because they uninterested in the news and are choosing not to inform themselves. 
Misinformation is probably a symptom of deeper socio-economic and psychological problems 
rather than a cause. Fighting the symptoms can help, but it should not divert us from the real causes, 
nor overshadow the need to fight for access to accurate, transparent, and quality information. 
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